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This article, drawing its title from Everything Flows, discusses the ways in which Vasily Grossman’s work can help in thinking about the problem of judging totalitarian perpetrators. Against Tzvetan Todorov’s assertion that Grossman effects a general absolution of perpetrators though his stress on the paralysing power of the totalitarian state, it offers a more nuanced reading. Grossman seeks to present a human face to the work of judgement; one which does not elide the complexities inherent in judging wrongs. To be sure, he takes seriously the suffocating power of the state, but he establishes its culpability not in order to absolve individual perpetrators but in order to affirm the primary solidarity of humanity. Grossman’s concept of ‘humanity’ emerges as a form of resistance to the state’s ideological treatment of humankind, and thus forms the ethical core of his work. Crucially, however, this does not produce a simple prescription for the treatment of perpetrators or comprehensive guidelines for the assessment of guilt and innocence. What Grossman offers instead is an encounter with the agony of judgement.
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In her memoir of imprisonment and exile, Eugenia Ginzburg recounts a discussion amongst Gulag inmates on the question of justice.​[1]​ One speculates that the incipient post-Stalin Thaw might lead to a judicial reckoning for those who are oppressing them, but wonders about its practicality: ‘What do you think would become of the countless petty commandants, guard officers, convoy guards? One enormous Nuremberg trial, is that what you have in mind?’ A fellow prisoner responds heatedly, emphatically affirmative: ‘Yes! Dozens, even hundreds of such trials! ... Pitiless vengeance! No, not vengeance, but retribution on all the accomplices and satraps of the tyrant! Let every small cog in that murderous machine receive its just deserts!’ (1981: 381-2). Although the Thaw did lead to the rehabilitation of many Gulag prisoners, such hopes for wholesale justice went unrealised. Decades later, the collapse of the Soviet Union stimulated another round of demands for punishment of communist perpetrators, most markedly in the former satellite states of Eastern Europe (Courtois, Werth, Panné et al., 1999). In 2008 the intellectuals and politicians who composed the ‘Prague Declaration on European Conscience and Communism’ called for recognition that ‘many crimes committed in the name of Communism should be assessed as crimes against humanity … in the same way Nazi crimes were assessed by the Nuremberg Tribunal’. The signatories appealed for the raising of consciousness across Europe about ‘the crimes of the Communist regimes’ and the ‘introduction of legislation that would enable courts of law to judge and sentence perpetrators of Communist crimes and to compensate victims of Communism’ (Prague Declaration, 2008).
That this call came almost 20 years after the demise of communism testified to the limited progress that had been made towards such a legal settlement of accounts. Yet it also demonstrated the persistence of a powerful sentiment that it was a political and moral necessity. There are various reasons why such formal judgement so far remains elusive. Some of these relate to the contingencies of post-communist politics: transitions from communism were generally effected through negotiation rather than popular revolution, and many former communists remained as important political figures in their newly-democratic countries. Consequently, anti-communist energies were often diverted away from the legal sphere and towards the cultural, with the establishment of memorial museums, institutes of national memory and historical commissions of inquiry (Mark, 2010).
Yet there are also larger issues of principle in play. It has often seemed as if the very pervasiveness of communist oppression exerted an inhuman force on perpetrators and victims alike, rendering subsequent judgement problematic. Irina Sherbakova reports an encounter with a former convict who by chance many years later met the man who had informed on her; the convict insisted that she had been able to put aside blame and bitterness towards him because of an appreciation of ‘the shameful things which the system itself had done to them’ (1998: 244). By the same token, it was remarkable how a regime that practised such terroristic governance ‘nevertheless retained the allegiance of some of its victims’ (Adler, 2010: 211): ‘it is not a myth’, Sherbakova writes, ‘that those who were shot sometimes died with the name of Stalin on their lips’ (1998: 239). In many ways, the dividing line between perpetrators and victims could be blurred and unstable. In analysing the memoirs of ‘Gulag boss’ Fyodor Vasilevich Mochulsky, Deborah Kaple notes that ‘frequently GULAG NKVD personnel ended up as convicts in the camps themselves. ... Was an employee who managed the system in fear any less a prisoner of it than his charges?’ (Mochulsky, 2011: 177). Such contexts make issues of agency and responsibility perplexing and intractable.
Vasily Grossman’s work offers us some valuable resources to help think through the question of judging totalitarian perpetrators, particularly Stalinist ones. This is an issue that he broaches most directly in his last major work, Everything Flows (2009), which includes a mock trial of four informers, dubbed the ‘four Judases’; but his depictions of perpetrators in his epic novel Life and Fate (2006) and in several of his shorter pieces are also highly relevant. Tzvetan Todorov has severely critiqued Grossman’s approach to this issue, arguing that he ‘refrains from judging his characters’ and ‘ultimately inclines toward general absolution’. Grossman, Todorov argues, places so much emphasis on the suffocating influence of the state that he emasculates his perpetrators and deprives them of moral responsibility for their actions. ‘To presume subjects to be so submissive is to have a very sorry opinion of them indeed; in effect, Grossman damns his characters with such excuses... However great the pressure, the individual remains responsible for his actions; otherwise he [sic] renounces his humanity’ (Todorov, 1999: 232). Grossman’s approach to perpetrators is presented not only as being flawed, but also as insidiously rehearsing the logic of totalitarianism itself. As he seeks to exonerate humanity of the crimes committed by the state, Grossman retrospectively exaggerates the extent of totalitarian control and reinforces the idea that the state must be the measure of all.




Todorov’s critique is understandable, given the stress Grossman does indeed place on the corrupting influence of the totalitarian state, and the enormity of its power against the individual will and conscience. In his landmark 1944 essay ‘The Hell of Treblinka’ Grossman suggests that it is not possible to blame the German people for the atrocities committed in their names, because ‘these people’s vices and crimes were born of the vices of the German national character, and of the German State’ (2010: 131). Repeatedly across his work, he invokes the mesmerising and paralysing power of the dictatorial state, ‘its heavy, multitrillion-ton mass, the super-terror and super-submissiveness that it evokes in a speck of human dust’ (2009: 67). Moreover, he is prepared to entertain pleas for clemency on behalf of his perpetrators on the grounds that they are the primary victims of the totalitarian state, or that they acted only out of common human instincts, including the desperate urge for survival. In Life and Fate, Sturmbannführer Kaltluft does not relish the murders he oversees in an extermination camp; he does not kill out of any bloodlust or hatred, but is motivated only by duty. It is his pursuit of a quiet life that leads him to commit atrocities.
If, on the day of judgement, Kaltluft had been called upon to justify himself, he could have explained quite truthfully how fate had led him to become the executioner of 590,000 people. What else could he have done in the face of such powerful forces – the war, fervent nationalism, the adamancy of the Party, the will of the State? How could he have swum against the current? He was a man like any other; all he had wanted was to live peacefully in his father’s house. ... Fate had led him by the hand (2006: 520).
Similarly, Anton Khmelkov, a member of Kaltluft’s Sonderkommando operating the gas chambers, is a former Red Army soldier who had been taken prisoner on the Eastern Front by the Germans in July 1941.
He had been beaten over the head and neck with a rifle-butt, he had suffered from dysentery, he had been forced to march through the snow in tattered boots ... . All he had asked for, all he had wanted, was life itself (2006: 518).
Even Obersturmbannführer Liss, the SS representative on the camp administration, wants only to spend time at home with his wife ‘wearing his fur slippers’ and to visit his mistress at the Institute of Philosophy in Berlin (2006: 459); he finds his work so distasteful and stressful at times that he is driven to drink.
In the mock trial of four informers in Everything Flows, Grossman also seems to take seriously pleas for mitigation on behalf of his defendants which emphasise the special circumstances, the self-interest and the history of suffering, fear and deprivation that led each of them to condemn the innocent. He asks of one, ‘can he be blamed when even better men than he were unable to make out what was a lie and what was the truth, when even pure hearts were powerless before the question: What was good and what was evil?’ (2009: 63) His informers are the hapless instruments of a state power they can barely begin to comprehend. Appealing for clemency, they ask:
What use is it now to attempt to find out who is guilty with regard to crimes committed in the era of Stalin? That would be like emigrating to the Moon and then starting a lawsuit about title deeds to a plot of land here on Earth. ...Why are you so eager to condemn those, like us, who are small and weak? Why not begin with the State? Why not try the State? Our sin, after all, is its sin. Pass judgement on the State … (2009: 68, emphasis in original).
The informers claim that everyone complied with the will of the state. (In Life and Fate, a prisoner in the Lubyanka jokes: ‘A certain Greek once said, “All things flow”; we say, “All people inform”’ (2006: 758-9).) So the crucial question is not one of individual guilt but rather: ‘What is the reason for this vile, universal weakness? Your weakness, our weakness, everyone’s weakness? This mass submissiveness?’ (2009: 68-9). Concluding, Grossman suggests that ‘dark saturnine forces pushed them. They were subjected to billion-ton pressures - and no one among the living is innocent’ (2009: 71).
Although Grossman thus takes seriously the oppressive totalitarian context in which his characters live (many of them, like Khmelkov, caught between two totalitarian systems), he does not simply condemn the state and exonerate the perpetrators. Although he explores the notion that totalitarian compulsion removes responsibility from individuals, his stance on perpetrators is not reducible to this position. For he also develops an ethical vision of ‘humanity’ which constitutes a form of resistance to the totalitarian state’s ideological ambitions, and particularly to its aspirations to fashion a ‘New Man’ (Fritzsche and Hellbeck, 2009). Just as the ‘New Man’ presupposes, and demands, a certain understanding of judgement and justice, so too does Grossman’s commitment to his concept of ‘humanity’. In part, the tension with Todorov arises because Todorov is concerned to juxtapose democracy and totalitarianism, and to protect the former from the latter. (As he puts it: ‘human virtue is too weak to cure all ills, and the only way to make totalitarianism impossible is to set a different political structure against it’ (2003: 73).) In contrast, Grossman is not particularly interested in discussing forms of governance, but is rather focused on the diversity of humanity, both in terms of the multiplicity of lives which contest the single-minded vision of the totalitarian state, and in terms of the complexity of each individual life. Relating Grossman’s concept of ‘humanity’ to the idea of the ‘New Man’ allows us to grasp how it serves as a source of resistance to Soviet conceptions of judgement, and thus as a basis from which to formulate a distinctive alternative stance. In rejecting the stark division of humanity into worthy and unworthy, or guilty and innocent, Grossman re-imagines judgement as an ethical dilemma or aporia, rather than as the application of legal and political doxa or scientifically-proven principles. 

The Soviet ‘New Man’ and Grossman’s ‘eternal humanity’

Totalitarian aspirations to fashion a ‘New Man’ entailed a particular stance towards judgement, and particular judgements. They assumed in the first instance that humanity was not something shared and universal, but rather a differentially distributed attribute - a cipher of distinction rather than of solidarity. Striving for what Leon Trotsky termed an ‘improved edition of mankind’ (Fritzsche and Hellbeck, 2009: 314) was inevitably accompanied by a corresponding persecution of those who were unwilling or unable to participate in the project of transformation. ‘The Bolshevik state preached a utilitarian morality that legitimated, and in fact demanded, the forcible removal of obstinate remnants of old life, in order to clear the path for the emergence of the new’ (Fritzsche and Hellbeck, 2009: 314). The Marxist-Leninist world-view of course conceived of History as a teleological and law-governed process, and the ‘New Man’ was to be the agent whereby History would lead to salvation. History – in this ‘upper-case’, metanarrative sense - is inevitably a process by which some are cast aside in favour of others. As Hannah Arendt put it: ‘Human beings, caught or thrown into the process of ... History for the sake of accelerating its movement, can become only the executioners or the victims of its inherent law’ (1994: 349). The role of justice was to serve the interests of the ‘New Man’ by interpreting and enacting the judgement of History, and accelerating the demise of these obsolete or recalcitrant forms of life. Stalinist ideological ambitions therefore served as a political guide rail, legitimating the persecution and murder of those deemed inimical to this project.
Grossman plays with a dual response to this Soviet standard for judgement and view of humanity. On the one hand, he stages a reappropriation of the notion of History as progress, and, on the other, he offers a repudiation of it. The first response entails a vision of the history of humanity as the story of an inexorably-emerging freedom. In Everything Flows, the Gulag returnee Ivan argues that ‘the history of life - from the amoeba to the human race - is the history of freedom, of the movement from less freedom to more freedom’. He asserts this against the claim of his cell-mate that ‘the humanity in humanity does not increase. What history of humanity can there be if man’s goodness always stands still?’ (2009: 204) While the progress of History for the state is grounded in the politics of Marxism-Leninism, Grossman’s narrative of freedom has a more biological derivation - it is an ‘evolution’, as shown by the development from ‘protozoa’ to man (2006: 674). The peculiar tragedy of the Russian people was that the increasing modernity of the state in terms of its industrial and technological sophistication had not been matched by a corresponding increase in political freedom. In fact, quite the reverse was the case. ‘Russian progress and Russian slavery were shackled together by a thousand-year-long chain’: the Bolshevik Revolution ‘was fated by Russian history to preserve Russia’s old curse: this link between progress and non-freedom’ (2009: 180-1). Ultimately, however, the progress of history towards freedom must prove irresistible. The totalitarian state was doomed by the ineluctable identity between humanity and freedom, and by the irrepressible assertion of freedom: ‘no matter how limitless the power of the State … all this is only mist and fog … only one true force continues to evolve and live, and this force is liberty’ (2009: 200). So Grossman here ascribes to freedom a vital political agency which counteracts the tendency towards despotism. Freedom is a force which, like Marxist-Leninist History, will judge. 
However, Grossman always remains somewhat ambivalent about this notion of freedom unfolding in a teleological movement. In Life and Fate, it is Dimitry Chepyzhin who argues that ‘the whole evolution of the living world has been a movement from a lesser to a greater degree of freedom’; Viktor Shtrum – Grossman’s alter-ego in the novel – responds: ‘You say life is freedom. Is that what people in the camps think?’ (2006: 674, 676) The reclamation of History in the name of freedom is problematic because it still subordinates human experience to an overarching rule or tendency. Thus it too dismisses some lives and experiences as inessential and contrary to, or outside of, the dominant progressive movement of humankind through time. Such reasoning is uncomfortably close to that which leads the Soviet state to designate certain groups as ‘former people’ (Smith, 2012). Moreover, it is at odds with Grossman’s repeated efforts to underline the singular variety of human life and human experience: witness, for example, his concern to record meticulously the wide range of occupations and personal characteristics of the victims of the Holocaust in his wartime essay ‘Ukraine without Jews’ (Garrard and Garrard, 1996: 170). For Grossman, ‘what constitutes the freedom, the soul of an individual life, is its uniqueness’ (2006: 539): ‘the only true and lasting meaning of the struggle for life lies in the individual, in his [sic] modest peculiarities and in his right to these peculiarities’ (2006: 214).
Grossman’s alternative and dominant mode of resistance to the ethos of the Soviet History and the ‘New Man’ therefore involves an emphasis on the eternal features of humanity. Since he believes that ‘freedom is the fundamental principle of life’ (2006: 674), the crucial question is whether this life is malleable. According to the Soviet view of the ‘New Man’, the essential features of man do not exist in its present form but in the future; man is a work in progress. Grossman grasps the implications of this claim and ponders whether ‘human nature undergo[es] a true change in the cauldron of totalitarian violence?’ This is vital because ‘if human nature does change, then the eternal and world-wide triumph of the dictatorial State is assured’; but ‘if [man’s] yearning for freedom remains constant, then the totalitarian State is doomed’ (2006: 200). Having posed the question, Grossman provides the answer: human nature, and its identity with freedom, does not change. ‘Man does not renounce freedom voluntarily. This conclusion holds out hope for our time, hope for the future’ (2006: 200).
In his essay ‘The Sistine Madonna’, inspired by a viewing of Raphael’s painting in Moscow in 1955, Grossman develops his ahistorical view of ‘humanity’. The Sistine Madonna ‘represents what is human in man. This is why she is immortal’ (2010: 185). Grossman imagines her appearing at various perilous junctures in human history, in Treblinka and the Gulag camps. She will also face future trials: ‘soon we will leave life; our hair is already white. But she, a young mother carrying her son in her arms, will go forward to meet her fate’ (2010: 192). So here the eternal character of human beings is contrasted with the passage of history. In his treatment of this theme across his work, Grossman notably oscillates between optimism and pessimism about the future of freedom. Here, even in a hymn to the resilience of humanity, he certainly does not display unbridled confidence. Although he asserts that the essence of freedom will ‘live forever and triumph’, contemporary political and technological developments cast a gloomy pall: ‘Together with a new generation of people [the Sistine Madonna] will see in the sky a blinding, powerful light: the first explosion of a thermonuclear bomb, a super-powerful bomb heralding the start of a new, global war’ (2010: 192).
Grossman’s work typically eschews dogmatic assertion and proceeds by canvassing various contrasting, even contradictory, viewpoints and orchestrating a conversation between them. So it is here with his ideas about ‘humanity’. Articulated against the Soviet vision of the ‘New Man’, with its associated notions of History and judgement, Grossman’s idea of ‘humanity’ as eternal would forestall a technocratic and utilitarian approach whereby judgement of today’s ‘criminals’ takes place in the interests of tomorrow’s ‘saints’. Rather, it grounds an ethic of human solidarity that accepts, and even embraces, non-perfectibility. It demands recognition not only that contamination with totalitarian guilt is a near-universal feature of society, but also that human weakness is shared and non-eradicable. This is not a contingent fact arising from a particular political context, but an essential one deriving from the nature of human beings as such. So judgement must always take place in this spirit of solidarity, and in painful recognition of the fact that no one is entirely good or bad. Viewed in this context, Grossman’s emphasis on the pressures exerted by the totalitarian state does not entail a rejection of the possibility for individual responsibility; rather it forms part of the attempt to reclaim the right to judge from the state and to reposition it with human beings.

The agony of judgement

In Life and Fate, Grossman repeatedly recurs to the contrast between his two terms. ‘Man’s fate may make him a slave’, he says, ‘but his nature remains unchanged’ (2006: 200). Elsewhere he tells us that ‘a man may be led by fate, but he can refuse to follow’ (2006: 521). Fate is necessity, which may manifest as the demands of the totalitarian state and its pervasive power, but life is freedom, an eternal counterpoint. Even though the power of fate may seem overwhelming, this does not reduce the perpetrator to a mere pawn in its hands. Rather ‘every step that a man takes under the threat of poverty, hunger, labour camps and death is at the same time an expression of his own will’ (2006: 519).
This insight is dramatized through the character of Ikonnikov-Morzh, the ‘holy fool’ imprisoned in a German concentration camp. Having realised that his work detail is involved in the construction of a gas chamber, Ikonnikov is cast into anguish. To continue to work will make him complicit in the deaths of innocent people, yet to refuse will inevitably lead to his own execution. He shares his torment with his fellow inmates:
I’m not asking for absolution of sins. I don’t want to be told that it’s the people with power over us who are guilty, that we’re innocent slaves, that we’re not guilty because we’re not free. I am free! I’m building a Vernichtungslager; I have to answer to the people who’ll be gassed here. I can say ‘No’. There’s nothing can stop me – as long as I can find the strength to face my destruction. I will say ‘No!’ Je dirai non, mio padre, je dirai non!’ (2006: 288-9, emphasis in original)
We do not directly witness the fate that subsequently befalls Ikonnikov. But the choice he has made is clear and later we are told that his refusal ‘to work on the construction of an extermination camp’ has indeed led to his execution (2006: 515). In the testament he leaves behind, he states plainly: ‘it is not man who is impotent in the struggle against evil, but the power of evil that is impotent in the struggle against man’ (2006: 394). Ikonnikov’s courageous decision, though extreme, represents one means to preserve and cherish human freedom in inhuman circumstances. Somderkommando Khmelkov is drawn towards a similar realisation as he ponders his own awful complicity: ‘he was dimly aware that if you wish to remain a human being under Fascism, there is an easier option than survival – death’ (2006: 519). Responsibility and sovereignty over oneself remain, even in the face of dire oppression.
Grossman is not prescribing suicide as the only acceptable response to the pressures of totalitarianism. Rather, his work offers a panoramic landscape of human behaviour and endeavour, peopled by characters who respond to particular circumstances and pressures in diverse ways. Elsewhere he shows us characters choosing to compromise, and wrestling with the consequences. Pre-eminently, towards the end of the novel, Viktor Shtrum is persuaded to sign a letter of denunciation against some fellow scientists, even though he has only recently courageously resisted persecution himself. Immediately, he senses the gravity of his plight:
He wanted to run down the street and scream … Anything, anything at all rather than this shame, this torment. But this was only the beginning. … And now he too had betrayed people. He was ashamed of himself; he despised himself. The house he lived in, its light and warmth, had crumbled away; nothing was left but dry quicksand (2006: 824).
Shtrum is in large part modelled on Grossman himself, and this moving evocation of his despair was informed by Grossman’s own history of accommodation with the Soviet regime. In 1952, under extreme pressure at the height of Stalin’s ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ campaign, Grossman had signed a letter calling for harsh punishment of some Jewish doctors accused of plotting against communism (2006: ix-x). There were other occasions, too, when Grossman chose not to resist, or speak up against, the regime’s persecution of people close to him. Even if these were counter-balanced by acts of bravery at other times, it is therefore easy to grasp why Life and Fate has been characterised as an autobiographical ‘dispatch from the front line of moral compromises’ (Zinik, 2011). Shtrum confronts his own weakness, and resolves to use the memory of his ‘terrible sin’ as a spur for the future:
And he wasn’t going to try to console himself or justify what he had done. He wanted this mean, cowardly act to stand all his life as a reproach; day and night it would be something to bring him back to himself. … Every hour, every day, year in, year out, he must struggle to be a man, struggle for his right to be pure and kind. He must do this with humility. And if it came to it, he mustn’t be afraid even of death; even then he must remain a man (Grossman, 2006: 825). 
To denounce Shtrum for his weakness would be facile, not least because he has already judged himself and passed sentence.
	Grossman’s portrayal of Shtrum also points to another fundamental element in his treatment of judgement, namely the realisation that human beings are complex creatures, mingling good and evil together. Grossman excels at showing us individuals against the backdrop of the great historic events of their time, confronting profound existential decisions.
His stories exemplify his ability to pick out the moments when an individual’s fate is decided or his or her personality is revealed … torn between fear and hope, between good and evil, between different sides of their own personality, not knowing which will take the upper hand (Hosking, 2011: 8).
Grossman’s vision of human beings resists essentialism as it insists that ‘good and evil [are] born together in one heart’ (2006: 854). ‘Human nature is what engenders these heaps of lies, all this meanness, cowardice, and weakness. But then human nature also engenders what is good, pure, and kind’ (2009: 70). This awareness of the multi-faceted nature of human beings inevitably conditions his approach to judgement, and instils suspicion of stark black and white rulings of guilt or innocence.
Grossman even allows for the complexity of his arch-perpetrators. In his chapter on Lenin in Everything Flows, he reviles Lenin’s dogmatism, his obsession with power and his uncompromising brutality towards enemies. But he refuses to replicate Lenin’s Manichean political vision in his own reading of the man. Rather, he brings Lenin’s political intransigence into conversation with his ‘pure, youthful delight in fine music or a good book’; his private modesty is contrasted with his political cruelty. Rather than dismissing the private Lenin as irrelevant (which historians, obsessed with the public, may be wont to do), Grossman invokes it in order to rescue Lenin from two caricatures, ‘the deified image’ constructed by the Soviet state and the ‘image created by his enemies’ of a monstrous and implacable tyrant. Rather, he argues for a third interpretation, in which Lenin is neither simply a saint nor a devil: ‘the overall picture turns out to be very different; it turns out to be complicated, in some ways tragic’ (2009: 173).
	Judgement, for Grossman, emphatically lies in the hands of humans rather than with any divine power or secular polity. The ethical systems and ideological messianism of these last must give way instead to the eternal values of ‘humanity’, and its incarnation of freedom. There are tensions here, however, which Grossman refuses entirely to resolve. If the prerogative for judgement rests with humans, then the judges must share in our weakness and corruption:
The man who pronounces judgement will be neither a pure and merciful heavenly being, nor a wise justice who watches over the interests of society and the State, neither a saint nor a righteous man - but a miserable, dirty sinner who has been crushed by Fascism, who has himself experienced the terrible power of the State, who has bowed down, fallen, shrunk into timidity and submissiveness (2006: 521).
Surely this is a further argument for general absolution? In addition to the mitigation provided by the well-nigh irresistible power of the totalitarian state, and the frailty of human beings, there are no exemplary figures, standing above the fray, available to pass judgement. Having raised this prospect, however, Grossman emphatically rejects it. ‘And this judge will say: “Guilty! Yes, there are men in this terrible world who are guilty”’ (2006: 521). This is Grossman’s fundamental insight into the agony of judgement, a process at once impossible and essential. We are not able to take recourse to external criteria for judgement, and so judging is an ethical encounter rather than a technical exercise. There is no standpoint from which we can painlessly and cleanly demarcate the good from the bad. Yet this does not mean that we can abdicate responsibility since, as Ikonnikov might rebuke us, we are free.
	Throughout his work, Grossman draws his readers in to the process of judgement, in all its ambiguities. This performative embodiment is most evident in the trial of the informers. Grossman opens with the vital question: ‘Who is guilty? Who will be held responsible?’ But then immediately he cautions: ‘This question needs thought. We must not answer too quickly’ (2009: 58). He addresses us directly throughout, as we are presented with the evidence and the pleas of the defendants, and are constantly counselled to be patient and to withhold judgement: ‘Let us not judge hastily. Let us give serious thought to this case. …let’s wait, let’s think. Let’s not condemn him without thinking. ... One needs to think carefully, to understand everything before pronouncing judgement’ (2009: 59-60, 62). Grossman places us in the role of judge, challenging us to confront the irresolvable dilemma.




Grossman’s work is neither an instruction manual for the judgement of perpetrators, nor an argument for its impossibility. At its heart is an ethic of human solidarity, a solidarity that persists even at the darkest moments of human history. Thus Grossman directly addresses the reader in Life and Fate as Sofya Levinton is murdered in the Nazi gas chamber: ‘her heart, however, still had life in it: it contracted, ached and felt pity for all of you, both living and dead’ (2006: 538). This ethic resists all attempts at political systematisation, and is primarily articulated against the chiliastic ideology of the Stalinist state, with its project to fashion a ‘New Man’ and to realise the ambitions of Marxist-Leninist History. All such projects inevitably lead to an instrumental treatment of human beings, violating their uniqueness and variety. Judgement must certainly not be subordinated to such an a priori principle.
On the one hand, we must take seriously the way in which totalitarian state power can crush individual agency, as it seeks to transform humans into ‘marionettes without the slightest trace of spontaneity’ (Arendt, 1967: 457). Equally, human complexity, and weakness, should also make us wary of passing judgement too hastily: ‘people did not want to do evil to anyone, but they did evil all through their lives’ (Grossman, 2009: 208). Yet, on the other, all this does not mean we can abjure judgement. Grossman gives enormous credence to the power of human agency and will, and leaves open the possibility for ethical action even in extremis and under the iron grip of totalitarianism. He also suggests that people become inhuman if they choose the simple platitudes of state ideology over the complex truth of humanity: witness the encircled German troops in Stalingrad, cut off from the Nazi state, finding themselves suddenly no longer ‘spellbound’ by its ‘inhuman power’ (2006: 715). The thoughtful, nuanced and restrained character of Grossman’s stance is remarkable when we consider that he formulated it from within the system that was persecuting him (Spufford, 2011).
Crucially, Grossman refuses to deny the humanity of his perpetrators. They too are revealed in all their complexity, as the bounds of human solidarity – crucial to resist the utilitarian logic of the totalitarian state - enfold victims of repression, perpetrators and readers alike. In relation to perpetrator fiction, Susan Rubin Suleiman notes that
the extended representation of a character’s subjectivity - not only actions but feelings, perceptions, opinions and way of being in the world - necessarily requires a degree of empathy... even if the character is loathsome, he or she must at least be recognized as human (2009: 2).
This is the spirit in which Grossman represents perpetration, inviting us to empathise with the human weakness of perpetrators at the same time as we repudiate their crimes. This, too, is a crucial component of the agony of judgement. Yet Grossman throughout also insists on our own responsibility for the choices we make, regardless of circumstances, and reminds us that our freedom can thus also form part of our fate. In Everything Flows, Anna Sergeyevna is a former party activist who was involved in implementing the policies that produced the famine in the Ukraine in the early 1930s. Having taken Ivan, the Gulag returnee, into her house, the two become lovers. Anna delivers a long and moving testimony to him about her role in the famine which killed millions, and her feelings of guilt. In the midst of it, she recalls an earlier conversation with Ivan, in which she had asked him how the perpetrators of the Holocaust could live with themselves after committing such atrocious crimes.
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